U.S. Troop Deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan
As part of a project that I'm working on, I've built a dataset of casualty figures from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Seeing as its Remembrance Day in Canada and Veterans Day in the United States, I thought I'd put a quick visualization together charting monthly U.S. troops fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The result paints a rather sobering picture of all the American lives lost over the past thirteen years.
Will Afghanistan sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States before November 2014?
Question: Will Afghanistan sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States before November 2014?
Prediction: 70 per cent chance that Afghanistan will sign the BSA before November 1, 2014
Both of the candidates vying to become the next President of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, have said that they intend to sign the agreement, which would secure continued economic and military support from the United States. While some of my teammates have expressed doubt that the BSA will be signed within the specified time frame, I am a little more optimistic that the current election crises can be resolved and the treaty can be signed in a timely fashion.
Taking the current situation on the ground into account, I have laid out a rough timeline of how the process will likely unfold:
September 10-12. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) announces the result of the vote audit. The IEC is currently 80 per cent of the way through recounting votes. They project that they will be done by September 10th. Further delays are unlikely, as both candidates have withdrawn thier election observers, so there is little chance squabbling over procedure will slow the audit down. I would expect the results to be announced soon after the count is finished.
End of September. New government is sworn in. I don't anticipate much delay between the completion of the election audit and the swearing in of the new president. Per Article 6 of the Afghan Constitution, Karzai’s term actually expired a couple of months ago, and he seems eager to hand over authority.
October. Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is signed. Signing the BSA is a fairly symbolic gesture. It only commits Afghanistan to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, pending full ratification. Signing treaties is also within the authority of the President. Per Article 90(5) of the Constitution, the National Assembly only needs to be involved at the ratification stage.
Once sworn in, the new President will be under a considerable pressure from both foreign and domestic sources to quickly sign the BSA. Uncertainty about the future of the American presence in Afghanistan has played havoc with the economy and bolstered the Taliban’s morale. Signing the treaty would end this uncertainty. Memories of the disastrous result of the Soviet withdrawal in the late 80s are also likely to encourage the new president to sign the agreement (the ongoing collapse in Iraq may also play a role).
It also helps that the November 2013 loya jirga (which included practically all of the important factions within the Afghan government) already endorsed the wording of the agreement.
Potential Spoilers
The biggest risk to the timeline that I've laid out is that the losing candidate won’t accept the result of the vote audit, which would delay the swearing in of the new president. There is certainly some chance that this could happen. Abdullah Abdullah, the likely loser, has already withdrawn his observers from the election audit because of frustration over the criteria used to weed out fraudulent ballots. He may, as a result, be unwilling to accept the IEC’s recount.
That being said, Abdullah Abdullah expressed the same concerns in the first round of the 2009 election (in which he also came second), and ultimately declined to go forward with a second round of balloting. If Ghani agrees to incorporate Abdullah into his government, as the U.S is urging, he may agree to concede quietly again.
Updating Strategy
If there are any delays to the timeline that I’ve laid out, I plan on adjusting my prediction downward (and the opposite if things go well). The candidates' reactions to the IEC’s election audit will be a particularly important moment. If the loser accepts the results, things are likely to go smoothly. If not, it becomes less likely that the BSA will be signed by the start of November.
[This post is the latest in a series of posts documenting my predictions for the Good Judgement Project]
Prediction: 70 per cent chance that Afghanistan will sign the BSA before November 1, 2014
Both of the candidates vying to become the next President of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, have said that they intend to sign the agreement, which would secure continued economic and military support from the United States. While some of my teammates have expressed doubt that the BSA will be signed within the specified time frame, I am a little more optimistic that the current election crises can be resolved and the treaty can be signed in a timely fashion.
Taking the current situation on the ground into account, I have laid out a rough timeline of how the process will likely unfold:
September 10-12. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) announces the result of the vote audit. The IEC is currently 80 per cent of the way through recounting votes. They project that they will be done by September 10th. Further delays are unlikely, as both candidates have withdrawn thier election observers, so there is little chance squabbling over procedure will slow the audit down. I would expect the results to be announced soon after the count is finished.
End of September. New government is sworn in. I don't anticipate much delay between the completion of the election audit and the swearing in of the new president. Per Article 6 of the Afghan Constitution, Karzai’s term actually expired a couple of months ago, and he seems eager to hand over authority.
October. Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is signed. Signing the BSA is a fairly symbolic gesture. It only commits Afghanistan to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, pending full ratification. Signing treaties is also within the authority of the President. Per Article 90(5) of the Constitution, the National Assembly only needs to be involved at the ratification stage.
Once sworn in, the new President will be under a considerable pressure from both foreign and domestic sources to quickly sign the BSA. Uncertainty about the future of the American presence in Afghanistan has played havoc with the economy and bolstered the Taliban’s morale. Signing the treaty would end this uncertainty. Memories of the disastrous result of the Soviet withdrawal in the late 80s are also likely to encourage the new president to sign the agreement (the ongoing collapse in Iraq may also play a role).
It also helps that the November 2013 loya jirga (which included practically all of the important factions within the Afghan government) already endorsed the wording of the agreement.
Potential Spoilers
The biggest risk to the timeline that I've laid out is that the losing candidate won’t accept the result of the vote audit, which would delay the swearing in of the new president. There is certainly some chance that this could happen. Abdullah Abdullah, the likely loser, has already withdrawn his observers from the election audit because of frustration over the criteria used to weed out fraudulent ballots. He may, as a result, be unwilling to accept the IEC’s recount.
That being said, Abdullah Abdullah expressed the same concerns in the first round of the 2009 election (in which he also came second), and ultimately declined to go forward with a second round of balloting. If Ghani agrees to incorporate Abdullah into his government, as the U.S is urging, he may agree to concede quietly again.
Updating Strategy
If there are any delays to the timeline that I’ve laid out, I plan on adjusting my prediction downward (and the opposite if things go well). The candidates' reactions to the IEC’s election audit will be a particularly important moment. If the loser accepts the results, things are likely to go smoothly. If not, it becomes less likely that the BSA will be signed by the start of November.
[This post is the latest in a series of posts documenting my predictions for the Good Judgement Project]
Cyber Terrorism, Revisited
All across the world, individuals, companies, governments, and even militaries have become increasingly reliant on the Internet for a diverse array of activities. Although this shift to Internet based activity has brought substantial benefits to consumers, companies, and governments, it has also created new vulnerabilities, which both state and non-state actors have sought to exploit.
In recent years, there has been an alarming increase in the number of cyber attacks upon government, corporate, and military systems—many by unknown actors. Responding to this emerging threat, governments across the world have launched a number of efforts to secure their nation's cyber space from both state and non-state actors.
There is, however, some contention about the magnitude and direction of these policies, as analysts disagree on both the degree of danger posed by cyber attacks and the most effective way to coordinate one's cyber security efforts. This disagreement is particularly acute when dealing with the threat posed by terrorist groups, as no consensus exists as to whether or not these groups pose a danger.
Attempting to clear up some of this confusion, this article examines the nature and severity of the threat posed by cyber terrorism and argues that cyber terrorism should be treated as a distinct and serious threat.
Are they a threat?
As things currently stand, there have been no publicly recorded instances of cyber terrorism. Instead, most cyber attacks are attributed to states—such as China, Russia and the United States—or criminal groups. As a result, the potential danger posed by terrorist groups is often overlooked, as it is argued that such groups either lack the capability or interest to launch such attacks. This is not, however, universally accepted. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that such groups may have both the incentive and resources to eventually acquire such a capability. If so, it may only be a matter of time until such groups become dangerous cyber actors.
As Gabriel Weimann has argued, cyber attacks have a number of features that would lend themselves to use by terrorist groups:
1. Cheap. Cyber attacks are relatively cheap. They can often be carried out using commercially available equipment and programs acquired from the shadier corners of the Internet. As such, the barriers to entry are relatively low, which is often an important consideration for groups with comparatively limited resources, such as terrorist organizations.
2. Anonymous. Cyber attacks can be conducted anonymously, as they can easily be routed across multiple jurisdictions. This makes them notoriously difficult to trace. Following up on such attacks often requires investigators to obtain warrants in multiple countries. Although 2001’s Convention on Cybercrime was designed to speed the process of obtaining such warrants, the treaty’s coverage is still rather thin. Only forty states have signed and ratified the treaty and the signatories are largely confined to the member states of the Council of Europe (with the notable exception of Russia) and a few smaller states. Outside of Europe, the only major treaty members are the United States, Australia, and Japan. Unfortunately, this coverage hardly provides the global scope necessary to quickly follow up on ongoing or recent attacks.
3. Target rich environment. The variety of targets is enormous. In the United States alone, there are over 80,000 dams, 60,000 chemical plants, 2,800 power plants, and 1,600 water treatment plants; many of these facilities have come to rely on the Internet, rather than proprietary networks, for control functions. The vast majority of such infrastructure is also owned and operated by the private companies, who often face incentives to cut corners on securing their networks. As such, there is a high likelihood that a determined attacker would be able to find systems vulnerable to infiltration.
4. Remotely conducted. Cyber attacks can be conducted from far beyond the borders of the countries in which one's targets lie, which means that terrorists do not need to risk arrest by domestic law enforcement agencies in order to launch their attacks. Conducting attacks remotely also nullifies many of the security advantages provided by state's investments into physical border security.
5. Widespread effects. Such attacks can potentially affect a large group of people. In 2000, the Lovebug virus affected 50 million systems in ten days and caused up to $15 billion in economic damage—and it was all launched by Filipino student working out of his dorm room in Manila.
Given these five advantages, it would be surprising if terrorist groups were not already developing, or at the very least interested in developing, the capacity to conduct operations in cyber space.
For many groups, adopting cyber attacks would also be a relatively natural evolution. Most terrorists already rely upon the Internet for communication, recruitment, and propaganda purposes. Using the internet to actually carry out attacks would only take things one step further. The recent rash of state-launched cyber attacks—including the United States’ attacks on Iranian centrifuges and Chinese incursions against American companies—will only further encourage such adoption.
Indeed, a number of prominent policy makers have already suggested that some groups are interested in doing so. As President Obama warned in his 2009 address on cyber security, “Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have spoken of their desire to unleash a cyber attack on [the United States]." James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, also issued a similar warning in the American intelligence community’s latest worldwide threat assessment in which he highlighted cyber attacks—including those by non-state actors—as one of the most critical threats facing the United States and the international community.
Weapons of mass inconvenience?
If the characteristics of cyber attacks suggest that we should be worried about their adoption by terrorist groups, it becomes important to analyze whether or not such weapons could cause significant damage or whether they are merely a “weapon of mass inconvenience,” as Douglas Birch has suggested. Such an analysis will be an important in determining the appropriate level of government attention to devote to the issue.
As things currently stand, there is considerable evidence to suggest that a well-executed cyber attack could cause significant damage, as an increasing portion of the world's critical infrastructure has come to rely on the Internet in order to operate.
Of particular concern is the increasing number of industrial Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems controlled via the Internet rather than through proprietary networks. These systems are frequently cited as potential targets for terrorists, because they control complex industrial infrastructure, such as power grids, dams, and chemical plants. If a terrorist group were able to breach the security of one of these systems, they could potentially cause a plant to explore, unleash millions of cubic feet of water upon an unsuspecting communities, or leave a large swathe of the continent in the dark. This type of attack would have devastating consequences.
Deadly or just inconvenient?
There are, however, a number of analysts who cast doubt on the actual impact of cyber attacks. Douglas Birch, for example, notes that power outages are a fairly common occurrence, which provides a good baseline to estimate the potential damage that could be caused by an attack against a nation's power grid. The effects of blackouts, he observes, are rarely catastrophic, even when the power goes out for several days, as most critical systems, such as emergency services and hospitals, have backup generators. This, in turn, leads him to conclude that cyber attacks are more likely to be a ‘weapon of mass inconvenience’ than a significant threat.
While Birch and others like him, such as James Lewis, have a legitimate point about the first order impact of a potential cyber attack, they fail to consider the secondary impact of terrorist attacks: the widespread fear and panic that they can cause. In addition to its initial impact, there is a substantial risk that a major incident of cyber terrorism would prompt a backlash against Internet based activity. This would have significant ramifications for western economies, as a large per cent of economic activity has come to rely upon Internet for a wide variety of functions.
High-tech terrorists
It might also be questioned whether or not terrorist groups have the technological capabilities to pull off such an attack. Rose Tsang of the Goldman School of Public Policy estimates that it would take a team of highly trained hackers six months to design a program to penetrate and control an industrial control system. If correct, this means that the barriers to employing an attack might be higher than some analysts have suggested.
This relatively high barrier to entry does not mean, however, that the possibility of cyber terrorism should be dismissed. Although terrorist groups are often imagined as drawing their members from the poor and disaffected masses, evidence from the social sciences suggests that terrorist groups often recruit members with significant levels formal education. Most of the suicide bombers involved in the events of 9/11, for example, had either university degrees or at least some form of post-secondary education. Engineers, in particular, seem to be over represented in Islamic terrorist groups. Indeed, both Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, the planners responsible for the events of 9/11, had backgrounds in engineering. This trend suggests that terrorist groups might be far more capable of assembling a cabal of sophisticated hackers than public perception would anticipate.
State versus non-state attacks
There are also those who dismiss the threat posed by potential cyber terrorists by arguing that we should be primarily worried about the cyber attacks that are already being committed by states. While states certainly have more organizational capacity and resources than terrorist groups, the threat posed by cyber terrorism is unique and should not be neglected.
States, unlike terrorist groups, have a limited incentive to cause major destruction, as they are often reliant upon the systems that a major attack would disrupt. Most states continue to depend on the west’s economic viability for their own economic fortunes, which discourages major attacks. China, for example, is highly dependant on the world financial system for its continued well being. It has, as a result, only a limited incentive to cause major disruption to to it. This means that states are far more likely to limit their online exploits to activities such as industrial espionage. Terrorist groups, by contrast, are not particularly reliant upon the Internet. As such, they are far less constrained than states. This, as Joseph Nye suggests, means that a “a cyber 9/11 may be more likely than the often mentioned cyber Pearl Harbor.”
Unique Threats Require Unique Policy Prescriptions
When taken together, the factors outlined above suggest that there is a need to craft specific cyber policies to address the unique and dangerous threat posed by cyber terrorism. The nature of the threat means that policies designed to deal with traditional cyber threats, such as state based attacks and cyber criminals, will not properly address the dangers of cyber terrorism. If nations should fail to take the unique nature of the full spectrum of cyber threat into consideration, they will leave themselves vulnerable to a potentially catastrophic attack.
Who will win the presidential elections in Afghanistan?
Question: Who will win the presidential elections in Afghanistan?
Due to widespread allegations of corruption and election tampering, an Independent Election Commission (composed of independent observers and overseen by the United Nations) is currently recounting ballots and invalidating those considered to be fraudulent.
As the matrix shows, the circumstances under which Abdullah ends up with more votes than Ghani are fairly limited. If 2 million or less ballots are invalidated, at least 80 per cent of the votes discarded will have to be for Ghani in order for Abdullah to win (and probably more).
Prediction: 70 per cent chance Ashraf Ghani wins; 30 per cent chance Abdullah Abdullah wins
Preliminary results suggest that Ashraf Ghani won 56 per cent of the vote in the second round of balloting, after winning only 31 per cent of the vote in the first round. Abdullah Abdullah, meanwhile, captured 44 per cent of the vote in the second round, down from 45 per cent of the vote in the first round.
Due to widespread allegations of corruption and election tampering, an Independent Election Commission (composed of independent observers and overseen by the United Nations) is currently recounting ballots and invalidating those considered to be fraudulent.
The New York Times is reporting that roughly 2 of the 8 million ballots cast may be fraudulent. The consensus also seems to be that more of Ghani's votes will be tossed out than Abdullah's, as a suspicious portion of Ghani's gains between the first and second rounds occurred in unstable and poorly monitored region.
There is, as a result, some chance that the Independent Election Commission will invalidate enough Ghani votes to make Abdullah the winner. Doing some back of the envelope calculations, I mocked up the following matrix, showing the circumstances under which Abdullah could clinch a victory (highlighted in dark blue).
There is, as a result, some chance that the Independent Election Commission will invalidate enough Ghani votes to make Abdullah the winner. Doing some back of the envelope calculations, I mocked up the following matrix, showing the circumstances under which Abdullah could clinch a victory (highlighted in dark blue).
As the matrix shows, the circumstances under which Abdullah ends up with more votes than Ghani are fairly limited. If 2 million or less ballots are invalidated, at least 80 per cent of the votes discarded will have to be for Ghani in order for Abdullah to win (and probably more).
The chances that over 80 per cent of the invalidated ballots will belong to Ghani are slim, as both candidates have been accused of stuffing ballot boxes. It is, as as a result, likely that the preliminary results will be upheld and Ghani confirmed the winner.
*The above model makes two major assumptions. One, anywhere between 1 and 2 million ballots will be invalidated (for the sake of comparison, 1.3 million votes were invalidated in the 2009 election). There is, however, a chance that more than 2 million votes will be invalidated, which increases the range of circumstances under which Abdullah can win. Two, the majority of votes discarded will belong to Ghani. While this seems like a fairly safe assumption based on current reporting, there is always room for surprises.
*The above model makes two major assumptions. One, anywhere between 1 and 2 million ballots will be invalidated (for the sake of comparison, 1.3 million votes were invalidated in the 2009 election). There is, however, a chance that more than 2 million votes will be invalidated, which increases the range of circumstances under which Abdullah can win. Two, the majority of votes discarded will belong to Ghani. While this seems like a fairly safe assumption based on current reporting, there is always room for surprises.
Will China seize control of Second Thomas Shoal before December 31, 2014?
I recently joined the Good Judgement Project, which is a forecasting tournament in which people from around the world predict global events. Time permitting, I've decided to document some of my predictions and the rationale behind them.
Question: will China seize control of the Second Thomas Shoal before December 31, 2014?
Probability: 15 per cent
As I see it, there are essentially three ways for China to 'seize' control of the Second Thomas Shoal, and none are particularly likely.
(1) The first possibility is that China will use force to expel the Filipino marines currently aboard the BRP Sierra Madre (which is the derelict ship the Philippines ran aground on the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999). The probability that China will use direct force to remove Filipino forces is, however, fairly slim. The last major military-to-military engagement over an island in the South China Sea (SCS) was in 1988 when Chinese and Vietnamese forces fought over the Johnson South Reef -- leaving 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. While there have been numerous incidents in and around the SCS since, they have been largely limited to interactions between fishermen and civilian maritime authorities from the various contesting states.
One major assault in the past 26 years means that the base probability of a direct Chinese assault on an foreign held island is really low (less than 5 per cent).
It is worth noting, however, that China has become increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea in the past couple years, so that does up the chance of a direct assault slightly.
(2) The second possibility is that Filipino forces abandon the Sierre Madre of their own volition and Chinese forces then move in. Given the nationalist rhetoric that has developed over the Spratly Islands, it is fairly unlikely that Philippine forces would simply up and leave. It would also be a major reversal of the Aquino government's current stance on the reef, and there doesn't seem to be any impetus for his government to go down such a road.
(3) The third possibility is that China's ongoing blockade of the shoal will force the Philippine marines to leave the Sierra Madre due to a lack of supplies. So far, however, the Philippines has successfully managed to circumvent the blockade and resupply its forces. There are even indications that the Philippines may be getting some intel/planning assistance from the U.S., as American planes have been seen monitoring resupply efforts. News stories about the Sierra Madre, like the NYT's profile of the ship, also suggest that the marines aboard the ship are able to do a fair amount of fishing, lessening the need for frequent resupply trips.
While this last possibility seems like the most probable of the three possibilities identified above, it still seems unlikely, given that the Philippines has indicated that it wants to maintain a force on the Shoal and has demonstrated an ability to get by the Chinese blockade.
The only other alternative I can think of is that the Filipino forces would abandon the Sierra Madre due to inclement weather, but the marines aboard the Sierra Madre weathered Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, so it would have to be a fairly powerful storm to force them off the ship.
Taken together, the factors identified above suggest that the overall likelihood of China seizing the reef before December 31, 2014 is very slim, though not beyond the realm of possibility.
Question: will China seize control of the Second Thomas Shoal before December 31, 2014?
Probability: 15 per cent
As I see it, there are essentially three ways for China to 'seize' control of the Second Thomas Shoal, and none are particularly likely.
(1) The first possibility is that China will use force to expel the Filipino marines currently aboard the BRP Sierra Madre (which is the derelict ship the Philippines ran aground on the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999). The probability that China will use direct force to remove Filipino forces is, however, fairly slim. The last major military-to-military engagement over an island in the South China Sea (SCS) was in 1988 when Chinese and Vietnamese forces fought over the Johnson South Reef -- leaving 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. While there have been numerous incidents in and around the SCS since, they have been largely limited to interactions between fishermen and civilian maritime authorities from the various contesting states.
One major assault in the past 26 years means that the base probability of a direct Chinese assault on an foreign held island is really low (less than 5 per cent).
It is worth noting, however, that China has become increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea in the past couple years, so that does up the chance of a direct assault slightly.
(2) The second possibility is that Filipino forces abandon the Sierre Madre of their own volition and Chinese forces then move in. Given the nationalist rhetoric that has developed over the Spratly Islands, it is fairly unlikely that Philippine forces would simply up and leave. It would also be a major reversal of the Aquino government's current stance on the reef, and there doesn't seem to be any impetus for his government to go down such a road.
(3) The third possibility is that China's ongoing blockade of the shoal will force the Philippine marines to leave the Sierra Madre due to a lack of supplies. So far, however, the Philippines has successfully managed to circumvent the blockade and resupply its forces. There are even indications that the Philippines may be getting some intel/planning assistance from the U.S., as American planes have been seen monitoring resupply efforts. News stories about the Sierra Madre, like the NYT's profile of the ship, also suggest that the marines aboard the ship are able to do a fair amount of fishing, lessening the need for frequent resupply trips.
While this last possibility seems like the most probable of the three possibilities identified above, it still seems unlikely, given that the Philippines has indicated that it wants to maintain a force on the Shoal and has demonstrated an ability to get by the Chinese blockade.
The only other alternative I can think of is that the Filipino forces would abandon the Sierra Madre due to inclement weather, but the marines aboard the Sierra Madre weathered Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, so it would have to be a fairly powerful storm to force them off the ship.
Taken together, the factors identified above suggest that the overall likelihood of China seizing the reef before December 31, 2014 is very slim, though not beyond the realm of possibility.
Militarized Disputes Involving China (1993 - 2010)
Over the past two decades, China has resorted to militarized action on a number of different occasions, ranging from the violent confrontations over the islands of the South and East China Seas to clashes along the North Korean border. In some cases, these disputes have been isolated incidents, like the sinking of a ship or a short border incursion. In others, they have stretched over a number of months or years and involved a series of escalating actions and counteractions. The question is, of course, why? and what does China's past behaviour say about the possibility of future disputes?
Understanding Militarized Disputes
When disputes arise between nations, national leaders have host of options at their disposal, ranging from lodging official protest to launching negotiations and from international legal mechanisms to economic sanctions. In the most extreme circumstances, they may even resort to threats, displays or uses of militarized force to achieve their objectives
Thankfully, such events tend to be rare, as resorting to force carries a variety of costs. When such incidents do occur, however, they can be exceptionally dangerous, as they have the potential to lead to considerable death and destruction. Understanding why and when nations resort to the use of force is, as a result, of considerable interest. And, the more powerful and capable the nation in question is, the greater the interest there is in understanding its decision making.
Militarized Disputes Involving China
To get a better sense of recent militarized incidents involving China, I turned to the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset. The dataset—which catalogues interstate disputes involving the threat, display, or use of military force—records 54 militarized incidents involving China between 1993 and 2010 (the last year for which records are available).
Each of these 54 disputes has been summarized and placed on the map and timeline above (click on each incident to bring up a summary of the incident).
Clusters of Conflict
As the map above illustrates, there were at least three distinct clusters of conflict involving China between 1993 and 2010. The first cluster centres around the Taiwan Strait and the long simmering confrontation between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments. The second cluster is spread across the waters of the South and East China Seas where a number of nations have laid overlapping claim to the islands within. The third cluster runs along the border between North Korea and China, which has often witnessed periods of heightened tension.
1) The Taiwan Strait. Between 1993 and 2010, the ongoing tension between mainland China and Taiwan was the most active source of militarized incidents involving China, including some fairly serious disputes. In 1996, for example, China's attempt to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate by conducting missile tests and military exercises quickly escalated and ultimately led the U.S. to intervene by sailing a pair of carrier groups through the Taiwan Strait.
There has not, however, been a serious militarized incident between the two nations since the mid-2000s, as Taiwan has elected a series of pro-Chinese governments in recent years.
2) The South and East China Seas. There are a much larger number of players involved in the disputed East and South China Seas. As things currently stand, six littoral parties—Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and China—have laid claim to either some or all of the islands, reefs, and shoals of the South China Sea (including the Spratly Archipelago, the Scarborough Shoal, and the Paracel Islands). These overlapping claims have led a number of militarized incidents between China and other claimants over the years, as the contesting parties have sought to control the region's resources and shipping lanes. Of the contesting parties, Vietnam and the Philippines have clashed with China the most frequently.
Japan and China, meanwhile, have repeatedly clashed in the East China Sea over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are currently controlled by Japan but also claimed by China and Taiwan.
3) North Korea. The relationship between China and North Korea is a complicated one, and China has resorted to militarized action to both support and coerce the North over the past two decades. In 1993, for example, China practiced military landings on the Korean peninsula, in order to show its support for the North. Then, in 2002, China forced its way into a Japanese and South Korean embassies to seize and return several North Koreans that were seeking asylum there. The very next year, however, China mobilized troops along the North Korean border to pressure the North during tense negotiations over its nuclear program.
North Korea, for its part, has also initiated military action against China on a number of occasions, though its reasoning has sometimes been less than clear.
4) Others. In addition to the major clusters identified above, China has also been involved in a smattering of other minor disputes, involving a range of players and issues. China and the U.S., for example, have both resorted to displays of force over the issue of whether or not the U.S. military can conduct maritime surveillance in China's exclusive economic zone. China and India have also had an uneasy relationship, and India has mobilized troops near the tri-junction of China, India, and Bhutan on a number of occasions in response to rumoured Chinese incursions.
Future Trends
All three of the major areas identified above remain potentially dangerous flash-points. In the case of Taiwan, any substantial move towards independence has the potential to trigger a Chinese reaction and potentially even an invasion. China is certainly preparing for such an eventuality. As the U.S. Department of Defence's annual report on China notes, the People's Liberation Army continues to regard the forceful reunification of Taiwan as its primary mission. While the base potential for a major clash or invasion remains low (particularly while economic relations remain healthy), the ramifications of such an incident would be considerable.
Braithwaite, Alex. “MIDLOC: Introducing the Militarized Interstate Dispute Location dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 (2010): 91-98.
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2004): 133-154.
When disputes arise between nations, national leaders have host of options at their disposal, ranging from lodging official protest to launching negotiations and from international legal mechanisms to economic sanctions. In the most extreme circumstances, they may even resort to threats, displays or uses of militarized force to achieve their objectives
Thankfully, such events tend to be rare, as resorting to force carries a variety of costs. When such incidents do occur, however, they can be exceptionally dangerous, as they have the potential to lead to considerable death and destruction. Understanding why and when nations resort to the use of force is, as a result, of considerable interest. And, the more powerful and capable the nation in question is, the greater the interest there is in understanding its decision making.
Militarized Disputes Involving China
To get a better sense of recent militarized incidents involving China, I turned to the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset. The dataset—which catalogues interstate disputes involving the threat, display, or use of military force—records 54 militarized incidents involving China between 1993 and 2010 (the last year for which records are available).
Each of these 54 disputes has been summarized and placed on the map and timeline above (click on each incident to bring up a summary of the incident).
Clusters of Conflict
As the map above illustrates, there were at least three distinct clusters of conflict involving China between 1993 and 2010. The first cluster centres around the Taiwan Strait and the long simmering confrontation between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments. The second cluster is spread across the waters of the South and East China Seas where a number of nations have laid overlapping claim to the islands within. The third cluster runs along the border between North Korea and China, which has often witnessed periods of heightened tension.
1) The Taiwan Strait. Between 1993 and 2010, the ongoing tension between mainland China and Taiwan was the most active source of militarized incidents involving China, including some fairly serious disputes. In 1996, for example, China's attempt to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate by conducting missile tests and military exercises quickly escalated and ultimately led the U.S. to intervene by sailing a pair of carrier groups through the Taiwan Strait.
There has not, however, been a serious militarized incident between the two nations since the mid-2000s, as Taiwan has elected a series of pro-Chinese governments in recent years.
2) The South and East China Seas. There are a much larger number of players involved in the disputed East and South China Seas. As things currently stand, six littoral parties—Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and China—have laid claim to either some or all of the islands, reefs, and shoals of the South China Sea (including the Spratly Archipelago, the Scarborough Shoal, and the Paracel Islands). These overlapping claims have led a number of militarized incidents between China and other claimants over the years, as the contesting parties have sought to control the region's resources and shipping lanes. Of the contesting parties, Vietnam and the Philippines have clashed with China the most frequently.
Japan and China, meanwhile, have repeatedly clashed in the East China Sea over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are currently controlled by Japan but also claimed by China and Taiwan.
3) North Korea. The relationship between China and North Korea is a complicated one, and China has resorted to militarized action to both support and coerce the North over the past two decades. In 1993, for example, China practiced military landings on the Korean peninsula, in order to show its support for the North. Then, in 2002, China forced its way into a Japanese and South Korean embassies to seize and return several North Koreans that were seeking asylum there. The very next year, however, China mobilized troops along the North Korean border to pressure the North during tense negotiations over its nuclear program.
North Korea, for its part, has also initiated military action against China on a number of occasions, though its reasoning has sometimes been less than clear.
4) Others. In addition to the major clusters identified above, China has also been involved in a smattering of other minor disputes, involving a range of players and issues. China and the U.S., for example, have both resorted to displays of force over the issue of whether or not the U.S. military can conduct maritime surveillance in China's exclusive economic zone. China and India have also had an uneasy relationship, and India has mobilized troops near the tri-junction of China, India, and Bhutan on a number of occasions in response to rumoured Chinese incursions.
Future Trends
All three of the major areas identified above remain potentially dangerous flash-points. In the case of Taiwan, any substantial move towards independence has the potential to trigger a Chinese reaction and potentially even an invasion. China is certainly preparing for such an eventuality. As the U.S. Department of Defence's annual report on China notes, the People's Liberation Army continues to regard the forceful reunification of Taiwan as its primary mission. While the base potential for a major clash or invasion remains low (particularly while economic relations remain healthy), the ramifications of such an incident would be considerable.
The resolution of the ongoing disputes over the disputed islands of the East and South China Seas also seems unlikely. While there have been a number of formal and informal efforts to manage/resolve the ongoing tension over the past two decades, little actual progress has been made. If anything, China has become even more aggressive about pursuing its claims in the region in recent years. This increasingly assertive posture is being driven by a combination of factors, including China's rapidly developing maritime capabilities, the growing strategic importance of the South China Sea, and the rise of nationalist sentiment within China. As none of these factors are likely to change anytime soon, periodic low level skirmishes between the various claimants are likely to continue.
Relations between China and the North, meanwhile, have appeared to cool since North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong-un, executed his uncle (who had close links to China). It also appears increasingly unlikely that North Korea's new leader will embrace Chinese style economic reform, as some had initially hoped. Kim Jong-un has instead engaged in a series or provocative maneuvers designed to consolidate his hold over the military and secure foreign aid and other concessions from the West. These provocations often put China in a difficult spot—forcing it to choose between supporting its neighbour and cooperating with the international community. It is hard to say, however, if lines of communication between China and North Korea have broken down badly enough for either side to resort to force to make a point.
Technical Stuff
For the purposes of the map above, a militarized interstate dispute (MID) is a “set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force.” Such interactions must also be government sanctioned in order to be considered MIDs. As a result, events like unsanctioned border incidents—which happen from time to time—are not included in the map above, unless they provoked an officially sanctioned military response.
Location data for disputes between 1993 and 2001 was drawn from the MID location dataset assembled by Alex Braithwaite, though some of the locations were subsequently modified. The location data for disputes after 2001, meanwhile, were manually generated by me. All locations are, of course, approximate. In some cases, location information about disputes was vague. In others, disputes occurred over a large area, so an approximate central location was chosen to represent the dispute.
What's Next?
I'm working on expanding the map to include more recent years. It will, however, be awhile before I have any major updates, as the current MID dataset ends in 2010. In order to add more recent disputes, I'm going to have to put the data together by hand, which is going to entail a fair bit of leg work.
SourcesRelations between China and the North, meanwhile, have appeared to cool since North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong-un, executed his uncle (who had close links to China). It also appears increasingly unlikely that North Korea's new leader will embrace Chinese style economic reform, as some had initially hoped. Kim Jong-un has instead engaged in a series or provocative maneuvers designed to consolidate his hold over the military and secure foreign aid and other concessions from the West. These provocations often put China in a difficult spot—forcing it to choose between supporting its neighbour and cooperating with the international community. It is hard to say, however, if lines of communication between China and North Korea have broken down badly enough for either side to resort to force to make a point.
Technical Stuff
For the purposes of the map above, a militarized interstate dispute (MID) is a “set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force.” Such interactions must also be government sanctioned in order to be considered MIDs. As a result, events like unsanctioned border incidents—which happen from time to time—are not included in the map above, unless they provoked an officially sanctioned military response.
Location data for disputes between 1993 and 2001 was drawn from the MID location dataset assembled by Alex Braithwaite, though some of the locations were subsequently modified. The location data for disputes after 2001, meanwhile, were manually generated by me. All locations are, of course, approximate. In some cases, location information about disputes was vague. In others, disputes occurred over a large area, so an approximate central location was chosen to represent the dispute.
What's Next?
I'm working on expanding the map to include more recent years. It will, however, be awhile before I have any major updates, as the current MID dataset ends in 2010. In order to add more recent disputes, I'm going to have to put the data together by hand, which is going to entail a fair bit of leg work.
Braithwaite, Alex. “MIDLOC: Introducing the Militarized Interstate Dispute Location dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 (2010): 91-98.
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2004): 133-154.
Breaking Down U.S. Development Assistance by Country and Region
Following up on some of the work I did yesterday, I put this graphic together, which drills into USAID data at the country level. Simply select a region and it will show net USAID disbursements to countries within that region between 2005 and 2012.
By the Numbers: U.S. Development Assistance
I've recently been digging into U.S. development assistance figures trying to get a feel for the U.S. aid strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. While I'm still trying to make sense of some of the trends, I've come across a number of interesting tidbits in the course of my research, which I thought I'd share.
1) A weak correlation between 'need' and aid
The correlation between U.S. aid per capita and a country's GDP per capita is fairly weak. Variation in GDP per capita only explains roughly 11 per cent of the variation in U.S. aid per capita.
2) The presence of outliers
There are some significant outliers in the data. I was particularly surprised at the extent to which the U.S. provides large disbursements to small island nations in the Pacific Ocean. Between 2006 and 2012, the U.S. distributed an average of $106 per capita in the Marshall Islands, $94 per capita in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and $88 per capita in Palau, accounting for an average of 35.2 per cent, 35.4 per cent, and 8.6 per cent of each country's GDP.
Curious about why the U.S. provides such a disproportionate amount of aid to these nations, I did a little digging. Unbeknownst to me, all three have compacts of free association with the United States. Essentially, each of these states has agreed to allow the United States to operate armed forces in their territory in return for access to U.S. programs and financial assistance.
Including these nations in the above chart has a dramatic effect on the observed relationship between GDP per capita and U.S. aid per capita--it turns a negative correlation into a positive one! However, given the unique arrangement between the U.S. and these countries, I've excluded them from the graph above.
3) Dramatic changes in the Middle East
Regionally speaking, the most dramatic change in recent years has been the decline in aid to the Middle East, which has fallen from $11.8 billion in 2005 to $2 billion in 2012. The change is largely explained by the drop off in aid to Iraq. Funding in most other Middle Eastern countries has remained stable. Aid to Africa and South and Central Asia, meanwhile, has been on the rise, though the latter trend is largely due to increased aid for Afghanistan in recent years.
1) A weak correlation between 'need' and aid
The correlation between U.S. aid per capita and a country's GDP per capita is fairly weak. Variation in GDP per capita only explains roughly 11 per cent of the variation in U.S. aid per capita.
2) The presence of outliers
There are some significant outliers in the data. I was particularly surprised at the extent to which the U.S. provides large disbursements to small island nations in the Pacific Ocean. Between 2006 and 2012, the U.S. distributed an average of $106 per capita in the Marshall Islands, $94 per capita in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and $88 per capita in Palau, accounting for an average of 35.2 per cent, 35.4 per cent, and 8.6 per cent of each country's GDP.
Curious about why the U.S. provides such a disproportionate amount of aid to these nations, I did a little digging. Unbeknownst to me, all three have compacts of free association with the United States. Essentially, each of these states has agreed to allow the United States to operate armed forces in their territory in return for access to U.S. programs and financial assistance.
Including these nations in the above chart has a dramatic effect on the observed relationship between GDP per capita and U.S. aid per capita--it turns a negative correlation into a positive one! However, given the unique arrangement between the U.S. and these countries, I've excluded them from the graph above.
3) Dramatic changes in the Middle East
Regionally speaking, the most dramatic change in recent years has been the decline in aid to the Middle East, which has fallen from $11.8 billion in 2005 to $2 billion in 2012. The change is largely explained by the drop off in aid to Iraq. Funding in most other Middle Eastern countries has remained stable. Aid to Africa and South and Central Asia, meanwhile, has been on the rise, though the latter trend is largely due to increased aid for Afghanistan in recent years.
Just Add Sand?
Over the past several months, China has constructed a number of artificial islands atop existing atolls and reefs in the middle of the Spratly island chain. The move is China’s latest volley in the dispute over the Spratly archipelago, parts of which are claimed by six different states.
Beijing’s decision to transform existing reefs and atolls into large, artificial islands is an interesting one. It follows in the footsteps of the Philippines’ decision to launch a legal case against China in which the central issue is whether or not the features of the Spratly archipelago occupied by China are, in fact, islands.
[China's constructed islands are to the west of the Second Thomas Shoal]
The Philippines' central claim is that a number of the features that China holds in the South China Sea fail to meet the technical definition of islands set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines islands as “naturally formed area[s] of land” that are above water at high tide and can sustain either human habitation or economic life. Instead, the Philippines has suggested that the features occupied by China are more appropriately categorized as rocks, submerged reefs, or low tide elevations.
The distinction between islands, rocks, and reefs is crucial one. While islands are entitled to both a territorial sea and a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), rocks are only entitled to a 12 miles territorial sea. Submerged reefs and low tide elevations, meanwhile, generate no rights at all. As such, islands have far greater potential to generate claim to resources in the sea than rocks and reefs. Every island, for example, has the potential to generate claim to resources in over 125 663 square nautical miles of water—an area roughly the size of a small country. Rocks, by comparison, may entitle states to as little as 452 square miles of water—closer to the size of a large city.
Building islands out of rocks and reefs
How does China’s construction of artificial islands atop existing reefs and atolls affect its claim to the South China Sea? In short, it doesn’t. Even if construction of the islands were legal—which is disputed—they do little to expand China’s right to exploit the surrounding waters of the South China Sea.
While coastal states have the right to establish artificial island and structures under Article 56 of UNCLOS, they may only do so within their own exclusive economic zone or territorial sea. Are, then, the artificial islands in question within China’s territorial sea or exclusive economic zone? Beijing certainly seems to believe so.
China is not, however, the only nation that has laid claim to the Spratlys. There are five other states—Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines— that assert ownership over some or all of the archipelago. And most of these nations disagree with China’s position. The Philippines, for example, has already filed two official protests against Chinese land reclamation at reefs in the South China Sea—arguing that the construction occurred in its waters and was thus illegal.
Unfortunately, the issue of who is entitled to what in the South China Sea is unlikely to be clarified anytime soon, so the legality of the constructed islands remains unclear, at least until the issue of ownership over the Spratlys is resolved.
But even if the constructed islands were legal, they would do little to bolster China’s existing maritime claims. As Article 60(8) of UNCLOS clearly states, “Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.” The most that states are entitled to do is establish a small safety zone around such artificial islands, which may not extend further than 500 meters or interfere with a recognized sea lane.
The artificial constructions do not, in short, affect the Philippines' claim that most of the features occupied by China in the Spratly archipelago are rocks, submerged reefs, or low tide elevations. International law simply does not allow states to transform rocks into islands by adding sand.
Mapping the Military Dimension of the Pivot to Asia
In late 2011, Hillary Clinton announced that the United States would begin to pivot its economic, military, and diplomatic assets towards the Asia-Pacific. The announcement, which coincided with the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Middle East, was intended to update American foreign policy to reflect the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region.
While Clinton’s announcement was well received by most of the region’s states, it was greeted with considerable suspicion and distrust in China. Of particular concern for Beijing, the military element of the pivot seemed squarely aimed at responding to China’s growing regional dominance. In some quarters of the Chinese government, it was even argued that the United States was aiming to contain China, much like it had worked contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Although the military dimension of the pivot to Asia certainly represents a distinct shift in strategy, most of the ensuing changes have been relatively modest. While there has been a slight growth in the number of American assets deployed in region, the U.S. has primarily concentrated on building partnerships with regional states. Both of these developments are certainly aimed at influencing China’s behavior, but they are a far cry from an effort at containment. Indeed, the U.S. and its allies appear to be making a conscientious effort to avoid such an appearance by limiting the scope and pace of military deployments and repeatedly stressing that containment is not, in fact, one of the United States’ objectives.
Pivoting From a Position of Strength
The U.S. military has long maintained an active presence across much of the Asia-Pacific. In addition to running a number of major bases in its Pacific territories (Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska), the U.S. has maintained a significant number of troops in Japan since the end of the Second World War and in South Korea since the end of the Korean War. It also has long standing defense pacts with a number of nations—including Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand—and active military relations with a number of others, like Singapore. Though officially recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole government of China, the U.S. has also continued to supply Taiwan with defensive arms and used the threat of potential intervention to prevent Beijing from considering forceful reunification.
Building on its already substantial regional commitments, the United States has gradually begun to expand its military footprint since the pivot was announced. There are three major components to this expansion. First, the U.S. has reached agreements to expand its presence in a number of territories, including the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. It has also proposed or discussed similar arrangements with Thailand and Vietnam. Second, it has begun to shift its naval assets towards the region. As then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced in 2012, the navy plans to base 60 per cent of its fleet in the Pacific (up from the then-50 per cent) by 2020, including six of its ten aircraft carriers. Finally, the U.S. has expanded the number of military exercises and port visits that it conducts in the region. In 2011, for example, U.S. Pacific Command conducted 172 different military exercises involving 24 different nations—a number which it has continued to build upon. It has even begun to include the People’s Liberation Army in some of its larger drills, such as the multilateral Cobra Gold and Rim of the Pacific exercises. Taken together, these military elements support the overarching objectives of the pivot to Asia, which the administration has identified as the desire to “sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms."
Expanding upon these three major elements, the following section (and above map) breaks down the military dimension of the pivot on a country-by-country basis.
Japan
The U.S.-Japan security alliance, which was forged in the aftermath of the Second World War, remains the United States most important regional relationship. Reflecting this status, Japan is currently home to more U.S. troops than any other location outside of the United States. At the end of 2013, over 50,000 U.S. troops located at roughly 90 different military facilities were based in Japan. Yokosuka, Japan is also home to the U.S. 7th Fleet and the navy’s only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington.
Roughly half of all U.S. personnel in Japan are currently based in Okinawa, which is strategically located in the East China Sea, close to both Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The presence of U.S. troops in Okinawa is, however, contentious, as many of the islands inhabitants have grown weary of the U.S. presence. Attempting to address the islanders’ concerns, the U.S. and Japanese governments have worked to move existing American facilities away from populated areas, but this effort has resulted in protracted political and legal wrangling. Nevertheless, both the Obama administration and the government of Shinzo Abe appear committed to making the move happen. Although this will ultimately result in the redeployment of some U.S. troops to Guam, it will help secure the U.S. presence in Okinawa for years to come. This will, in turn, ensure that the U.S. can continue to quickly react to developing situations in Taiwan or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—both potential regional flashpoints.
Japan has also committed to purchasing 42 of Lockheed Martin’s next generation stealth fighter, the F-35. The final number will, however, depend on the final cost of jets, which has risen considerably in recent years. Nevertheless, Japan’s decision to purchase the jets is an important one. In addition to strengthening ties between the U.S. and Japanese defense industries, the F-35s will enhance interoperability between Japanese and U.S. forces, as the F-35s are designed to share battlefield information amongst themselves.
South Korea
After Japan and Hawaii, South Korea is home to the third most American troops in the Asia-Pacific—roughly 28,000 in all. While primarily deployed to guard against potential North Korean provocations, U.S. forces in Korea have gained increased flexibility over the past decade, as the U.S. has consolidated its military bases and handed most frontline duties over to the South Koreans. Completing this transfer, the U.S. is slated to return responsibility for wartime command of South Korean forces to Seoul in 2015, though this may be delayed because of renewed concerns about North Korea. Taken together, these changes have left U.S. forces better positioned to respond to a variety of regional developments, while still maintaining their ability to respond to provocations by North Korea.
South Korea, like Japan, has also committed to purchasing a number of F-35s. As of March 2014, South Korea had ordered 40 F-35s.
Australia
Although a long-time American ally, the U.S. has only recently sought to reestablish a major presence in Australia. Shortly after Clinton announced the pivot to Asia, President Obama travelled to Australia to announce that the United States planned to regularly rotate up to 2,500 marines through Darwin, which is located on Australia’s northern coast. The announcement, made before the Australian parliament, remains the biggest new troop deployment since the pivot was announced, though the first troops did not begin to arrive until earlier this year.
The United States and Australia have also discussed several other proposals in recent years, including using HMAS Stirling (near Perth) as a forward operating base for U.S. nuclear submarines and potentially even carriers. Nothing has been formalized yet, though. As a recent report noted, one of the benefits of being able to use HMAS Stirling is that it sits outside the operational range of most of China’s planes, diesel submarines, and ballistic missiles, while still offering convenient access to much of the region. The base would, however, need retrofits before accommodating U.S. ships.
Another proposal being considered is using Australia’s Cocos Islands as a replacement for the U.S.’s current Indian Ocean base on Diego Garcia, which may be forced to close at the end of 2016. Located south of Sumatra, the Cocos Islands are ideally located for conducting manned and unmanned surveillance operations over the contested-South China Sea.
Of all of the U.S.’s Pacific partners, Australia has ordered the largest number of F-35s—72 in total now.
Singapore
Strategically located next to the Strait of Malacca, Singapore has become an increasingly important partner in recent years. Building on a 2005 strategic framework agreement, which allowed the U.S. military to continue using facilities within Singapore, Singapore recently agreed to host four littoral combat ships. The ships, the first of which arrived in 2012, will enhance the U.S.’s ability to participate in anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca, which roughly 40 per cent of the world’s trade flows through.
Singapore has also participated in the F-35 program since 2003 and is rumored to be considering buying a number of F-35Bs, the short take off and vertical landing versions of the jet.
Philippines
Colored by the legacy of American colonialism, the U.S.-Philippines alliance has always been a complicated one. Expelled from its major bases after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Philippines only recently signed a new 10-year security pact, which will allow the U.S. to rotate more troops, ships, and planes through the Philippines. Though the specifics have yet to be finalized, “the United States is expected to gradually deploy combat ships, a squadron of F18s or F16s and maritime surveillance aircraft,” according to a source interviewed by Reuters.
While the U.S. had initially hoped to return to its old bases at Subic Bay on the northern island of Luzon, the Philippines recently suggested that the U.S. Navy use (and fund improvements for) the Philippine base at Oyster Bay, which is much closer to the disputed Spratly Islands.
Even prior to the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, military ties between the U.S. and the Philippines had grown considerably in recent years. A total of 149 navy ships visited the Philippines in 2013 up from 68 the year before. In 2011, the U.S. also sold the Philippines a pair of excess Hamilton-class coastguard cutters, which have played a key role in skirmishes between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands.
Thailand
Although a longstanding defense partner, Thailand’s relationship with the U.S. has been complicated by the military’s recent overthrow of the country’s democratically elected government. The U.S. has, as a result, moved to suspend all military ties with Thailand.
Prior to the coup, however, the U.S. and Thailand had enjoyed robust and growing military ties. In addition to hosting the annual Cobra Gold Military exercise with the U.S., Thailand had recently discussed allowing the U.S. expand its presence at U-Tapao—a former transit point used during the Vietnam War.
New Zealand
In 2012, U.S. troops returned to New Zealand for the first time since the ANZUS (Australian-New Zealand-U.S.) alliance collapsed in 1984. The countries also signed a pair of agreements pledging cooperation on security issues in the Asia-Pacific and establishing new a forum for security related dialogue.
While a renewal of the ANZUS alliance does not appear to be in the cards and American ships remained banned from New Zealand waters, ties are warmer than they have been in years. In addition to fighting together in Afghanistan, U.S. and New Zealand troops have participated in a number of military exercises together since military ties were reinstated in 2009.
India
Military-to-military ties between the United States and India have grown considerably since the early 2000s. Viewing India as a potential counterbalance to China’s growing power, the U.S. has sought to initiate a wide range of contacts with India’s military establishment; the U.S. now participates in significant number of military exercises with Indian forces.
India, which is the world’s largest importer of arms, has also become an increasingly important purchaser of American made military goods, though Russia continues to be India’s primary supplier of foreign arms. In 2011, for example, India inked a deal to purchase over four billion dollars in C-17 Globemasters, an American made heavy transport plane.
British Indian Ocean Territory
The United States shares a large ship and submarine base with the British on Diego Garcia, which is currently home to over 500 American troops. The future of the facility is, however, uncertain. The U.S. lease expires in 2016; it remains unclear if it will be renewed, as the U.K is under pressure to return the island to Mauritius. Preparing for this possibility, the U.S. has begun to explore potential replacement facilities, such as Australia’s Cocos Islands.
Indonesia
U.S-Indonesian security collaboration currently revolves around the twin pillars of peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. Both the victims of al-Qaeda linked terrorists in the early 2000s, the U.S. and Indonesia have since forged a substantial partnership dedicated to tackling terrorist networks in Southeast Asia. The other major pillar of U.S. military engagement with Indonesia is support for its peacekeeping efforts. Jakarta is currently the largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping forces in Southeast Asia. Supporting Indonesia’s contributions to the U.N., the U.S. has helped fund the creation of a multi-use training facility in the town of Bogor, including the construction of three 300 bed barracks.
The U.S. and Indonesia have also begun to explore cooperation in other areas, including arms transfers and sales. After President Bush lifted the ban on military transfers to Indonesia in 2005, Congress approved $6 million in grants and loans for weapons and military equipment needed by the Indonesian navy for maritime security. More recently, the U.S. has decided to give Jakarta two dozen excess F-16s, which will be upgraded with weapons and engines purchased from American suppliers. These upgrades are projected to be worth $750 million.
Taiwan
The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is a complicated one. Though officially supporting a ‘One China’ policy, the U.S has insisted that the Taiwan issue must be settled in a peaceful manner. To this end, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which stipulated that the U.S. should provide Taiwan with defensive arms and maintain the capacity to prevent Taiwan’s forceful reunification. Maintaining this commitment, President Obama has agreed to sell two separate packages of arms to Taiwan since coming to office—$6.4 billion worth of arms in 2010 and $5.9 billion worth of arms in 2011. Obama did, however, back down from selling Taiwan upgraded F-16 C/D fighter jets, as both Taiwan and many in Congress had requested. The decision was seen by many to be a direct concession to China, which had warned the U.S. against such a sale.
Either way, the decision would have done little to change the balance of power across the Strait of Taiwan, which has shifted heavily in Beijing’s favor over the past decade. More importantly, it is the U.S.’s implicit threat to intervene in any attempt at forceful reunification that continues to discourage the PRC from considering aggression.
Vietnam
Despite a bitter history, the U.S. and Vietnam have become increasingly close in recent year. Looking to help Vietnam secure its maritime territories—large swathes of which are contested by China— the U.S. has provided Hanoi with $18 million to enhance its coastal patrol units and search and rescue forces. The Pentagon, meanwhile, has sought greater access to naval facilities at Cam Ranh, which was one of the major ports used by the U.S. during the Vietnam War. Although Vietnam already allows non-combat ships to dock at Cam Ranh, the navy would like Vietnam to relax its remaining restrictions. Vietnam, for its part, has lobbied the U.S. to lift existing prohibitions on the sale of lethal military goods to Vietnam.
Malaysia
President Obama recently wrapped up the first presidential visit to Malaysia since Bill Clinton visited in 1998. Although there are only a handful of U.S. troops stationed in Malaysia at the moment, Malaysia has recently become a regular participant in regional military exercises sponsored by the U.S. military, such as Cobra Gold, which it joined in 2012, and the Rim of the Pacific, which it joined in 2010. Port visits by U.S. naval ships have also increased in recent years, going from just a handful of visits a decade ago to over thirty in 2012. American and Malaysian forces also cooperated in the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.
Cambodia
After reestablishing military cooperation in 2006, American engagement with Cambodian forces has increased steadily. In 2007, the navy made its first port calls to Cambodia in over three decades. Then, in 2010, Cambodia co-hosted its first large scale multilateral peacekeeping exercise with the United States. Dubbed ‘Angkor Sentinel,’ the exercise has become an annual affair.
Papua New Guinea
In addition to providing training to the Papua New Guinea Defense Force, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea have held a number of small scale training exercises in recent years. Papua New Guinea has also participated alongside the U.S. in a number of multinational exercises, such as the ‘Southern Katipo’ exercise held in New Zealand in 2013.
Mongolia
In return for supporting US led coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan—where 350 Mongolian troops recently completed their tenth rotation of the war—the U.S. spends roughly $2 million a year on equipment and $1 million a year on training for Mongolian forces. Looking to further expand their existing cooperation, Defense Secretary Hagel visited Ulan Bator in April 2014 and signed a joint vision statement pledging to provide additional military training and assistance in coming years.
The U.S.-Japan security alliance, which was forged in the aftermath of the Second World War, remains the United States most important regional relationship. Reflecting this status, Japan is currently home to more U.S. troops than any other location outside of the United States. At the end of 2013, over 50,000 U.S. troops located at roughly 90 different military facilities were based in Japan. Yokosuka, Japan is also home to the U.S. 7th Fleet and the navy’s only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington.
Roughly half of all U.S. personnel in Japan are currently based in Okinawa, which is strategically located in the East China Sea, close to both Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The presence of U.S. troops in Okinawa is, however, contentious, as many of the islands inhabitants have grown weary of the U.S. presence. Attempting to address the islanders’ concerns, the U.S. and Japanese governments have worked to move existing American facilities away from populated areas, but this effort has resulted in protracted political and legal wrangling. Nevertheless, both the Obama administration and the government of Shinzo Abe appear committed to making the move happen. Although this will ultimately result in the redeployment of some U.S. troops to Guam, it will help secure the U.S. presence in Okinawa for years to come. This will, in turn, ensure that the U.S. can continue to quickly react to developing situations in Taiwan or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—both potential regional flashpoints.
Japan has also committed to purchasing 42 of Lockheed Martin’s next generation stealth fighter, the F-35. The final number will, however, depend on the final cost of jets, which has risen considerably in recent years. Nevertheless, Japan’s decision to purchase the jets is an important one. In addition to strengthening ties between the U.S. and Japanese defense industries, the F-35s will enhance interoperability between Japanese and U.S. forces, as the F-35s are designed to share battlefield information amongst themselves.
South Korea
After Japan and Hawaii, South Korea is home to the third most American troops in the Asia-Pacific—roughly 28,000 in all. While primarily deployed to guard against potential North Korean provocations, U.S. forces in Korea have gained increased flexibility over the past decade, as the U.S. has consolidated its military bases and handed most frontline duties over to the South Koreans. Completing this transfer, the U.S. is slated to return responsibility for wartime command of South Korean forces to Seoul in 2015, though this may be delayed because of renewed concerns about North Korea. Taken together, these changes have left U.S. forces better positioned to respond to a variety of regional developments, while still maintaining their ability to respond to provocations by North Korea.
South Korea, like Japan, has also committed to purchasing a number of F-35s. As of March 2014, South Korea had ordered 40 F-35s.
Australia
Although a long-time American ally, the U.S. has only recently sought to reestablish a major presence in Australia. Shortly after Clinton announced the pivot to Asia, President Obama travelled to Australia to announce that the United States planned to regularly rotate up to 2,500 marines through Darwin, which is located on Australia’s northern coast. The announcement, made before the Australian parliament, remains the biggest new troop deployment since the pivot was announced, though the first troops did not begin to arrive until earlier this year.
The United States and Australia have also discussed several other proposals in recent years, including using HMAS Stirling (near Perth) as a forward operating base for U.S. nuclear submarines and potentially even carriers. Nothing has been formalized yet, though. As a recent report noted, one of the benefits of being able to use HMAS Stirling is that it sits outside the operational range of most of China’s planes, diesel submarines, and ballistic missiles, while still offering convenient access to much of the region. The base would, however, need retrofits before accommodating U.S. ships.
Another proposal being considered is using Australia’s Cocos Islands as a replacement for the U.S.’s current Indian Ocean base on Diego Garcia, which may be forced to close at the end of 2016. Located south of Sumatra, the Cocos Islands are ideally located for conducting manned and unmanned surveillance operations over the contested-South China Sea.
Of all of the U.S.’s Pacific partners, Australia has ordered the largest number of F-35s—72 in total now.
Singapore
Strategically located next to the Strait of Malacca, Singapore has become an increasingly important partner in recent years. Building on a 2005 strategic framework agreement, which allowed the U.S. military to continue using facilities within Singapore, Singapore recently agreed to host four littoral combat ships. The ships, the first of which arrived in 2012, will enhance the U.S.’s ability to participate in anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca, which roughly 40 per cent of the world’s trade flows through.
Singapore has also participated in the F-35 program since 2003 and is rumored to be considering buying a number of F-35Bs, the short take off and vertical landing versions of the jet.
Philippines
Colored by the legacy of American colonialism, the U.S.-Philippines alliance has always been a complicated one. Expelled from its major bases after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Philippines only recently signed a new 10-year security pact, which will allow the U.S. to rotate more troops, ships, and planes through the Philippines. Though the specifics have yet to be finalized, “the United States is expected to gradually deploy combat ships, a squadron of F18s or F16s and maritime surveillance aircraft,” according to a source interviewed by Reuters.
While the U.S. had initially hoped to return to its old bases at Subic Bay on the northern island of Luzon, the Philippines recently suggested that the U.S. Navy use (and fund improvements for) the Philippine base at Oyster Bay, which is much closer to the disputed Spratly Islands.
Even prior to the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, military ties between the U.S. and the Philippines had grown considerably in recent years. A total of 149 navy ships visited the Philippines in 2013 up from 68 the year before. In 2011, the U.S. also sold the Philippines a pair of excess Hamilton-class coastguard cutters, which have played a key role in skirmishes between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands.
Thailand
Although a longstanding defense partner, Thailand’s relationship with the U.S. has been complicated by the military’s recent overthrow of the country’s democratically elected government. The U.S. has, as a result, moved to suspend all military ties with Thailand.
Prior to the coup, however, the U.S. and Thailand had enjoyed robust and growing military ties. In addition to hosting the annual Cobra Gold Military exercise with the U.S., Thailand had recently discussed allowing the U.S. expand its presence at U-Tapao—a former transit point used during the Vietnam War.
New Zealand
In 2012, U.S. troops returned to New Zealand for the first time since the ANZUS (Australian-New Zealand-U.S.) alliance collapsed in 1984. The countries also signed a pair of agreements pledging cooperation on security issues in the Asia-Pacific and establishing new a forum for security related dialogue.
While a renewal of the ANZUS alliance does not appear to be in the cards and American ships remained banned from New Zealand waters, ties are warmer than they have been in years. In addition to fighting together in Afghanistan, U.S. and New Zealand troops have participated in a number of military exercises together since military ties were reinstated in 2009.
India
Military-to-military ties between the United States and India have grown considerably since the early 2000s. Viewing India as a potential counterbalance to China’s growing power, the U.S. has sought to initiate a wide range of contacts with India’s military establishment; the U.S. now participates in significant number of military exercises with Indian forces.
India, which is the world’s largest importer of arms, has also become an increasingly important purchaser of American made military goods, though Russia continues to be India’s primary supplier of foreign arms. In 2011, for example, India inked a deal to purchase over four billion dollars in C-17 Globemasters, an American made heavy transport plane.
British Indian Ocean Territory
The United States shares a large ship and submarine base with the British on Diego Garcia, which is currently home to over 500 American troops. The future of the facility is, however, uncertain. The U.S. lease expires in 2016; it remains unclear if it will be renewed, as the U.K is under pressure to return the island to Mauritius. Preparing for this possibility, the U.S. has begun to explore potential replacement facilities, such as Australia’s Cocos Islands.
Indonesia
U.S-Indonesian security collaboration currently revolves around the twin pillars of peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. Both the victims of al-Qaeda linked terrorists in the early 2000s, the U.S. and Indonesia have since forged a substantial partnership dedicated to tackling terrorist networks in Southeast Asia. The other major pillar of U.S. military engagement with Indonesia is support for its peacekeeping efforts. Jakarta is currently the largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping forces in Southeast Asia. Supporting Indonesia’s contributions to the U.N., the U.S. has helped fund the creation of a multi-use training facility in the town of Bogor, including the construction of three 300 bed barracks.
The U.S. and Indonesia have also begun to explore cooperation in other areas, including arms transfers and sales. After President Bush lifted the ban on military transfers to Indonesia in 2005, Congress approved $6 million in grants and loans for weapons and military equipment needed by the Indonesian navy for maritime security. More recently, the U.S. has decided to give Jakarta two dozen excess F-16s, which will be upgraded with weapons and engines purchased from American suppliers. These upgrades are projected to be worth $750 million.
Taiwan
The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is a complicated one. Though officially supporting a ‘One China’ policy, the U.S has insisted that the Taiwan issue must be settled in a peaceful manner. To this end, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which stipulated that the U.S. should provide Taiwan with defensive arms and maintain the capacity to prevent Taiwan’s forceful reunification. Maintaining this commitment, President Obama has agreed to sell two separate packages of arms to Taiwan since coming to office—$6.4 billion worth of arms in 2010 and $5.9 billion worth of arms in 2011. Obama did, however, back down from selling Taiwan upgraded F-16 C/D fighter jets, as both Taiwan and many in Congress had requested. The decision was seen by many to be a direct concession to China, which had warned the U.S. against such a sale.
Either way, the decision would have done little to change the balance of power across the Strait of Taiwan, which has shifted heavily in Beijing’s favor over the past decade. More importantly, it is the U.S.’s implicit threat to intervene in any attempt at forceful reunification that continues to discourage the PRC from considering aggression.
Vietnam
Despite a bitter history, the U.S. and Vietnam have become increasingly close in recent year. Looking to help Vietnam secure its maritime territories—large swathes of which are contested by China— the U.S. has provided Hanoi with $18 million to enhance its coastal patrol units and search and rescue forces. The Pentagon, meanwhile, has sought greater access to naval facilities at Cam Ranh, which was one of the major ports used by the U.S. during the Vietnam War. Although Vietnam already allows non-combat ships to dock at Cam Ranh, the navy would like Vietnam to relax its remaining restrictions. Vietnam, for its part, has lobbied the U.S. to lift existing prohibitions on the sale of lethal military goods to Vietnam.
Malaysia
President Obama recently wrapped up the first presidential visit to Malaysia since Bill Clinton visited in 1998. Although there are only a handful of U.S. troops stationed in Malaysia at the moment, Malaysia has recently become a regular participant in regional military exercises sponsored by the U.S. military, such as Cobra Gold, which it joined in 2012, and the Rim of the Pacific, which it joined in 2010. Port visits by U.S. naval ships have also increased in recent years, going from just a handful of visits a decade ago to over thirty in 2012. American and Malaysian forces also cooperated in the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.
Cambodia
After reestablishing military cooperation in 2006, American engagement with Cambodian forces has increased steadily. In 2007, the navy made its first port calls to Cambodia in over three decades. Then, in 2010, Cambodia co-hosted its first large scale multilateral peacekeeping exercise with the United States. Dubbed ‘Angkor Sentinel,’ the exercise has become an annual affair.
Papua New Guinea
In addition to providing training to the Papua New Guinea Defense Force, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea have held a number of small scale training exercises in recent years. Papua New Guinea has also participated alongside the U.S. in a number of multinational exercises, such as the ‘Southern Katipo’ exercise held in New Zealand in 2013.
Mongolia
In return for supporting US led coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan—where 350 Mongolian troops recently completed their tenth rotation of the war—the U.S. spends roughly $2 million a year on equipment and $1 million a year on training for Mongolian forces. Looking to further expand their existing cooperation, Defense Secretary Hagel visited Ulan Bator in April 2014 and signed a joint vision statement pledging to provide additional military training and assistance in coming years.
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